Library Guide
Southern California Citrus Industry

Print Books

Brown, John, and James Boyd. History of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. Western Historical Assn, 1922. Ref F868.S14 B8 (see vol. 2, p. 902, for citrus industry information)


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“California Citrus SHP.” California State Parks, [https://www.parks.ca.gov/](https://www.parks.ca.gov/).


Print Books on Local History (may have citrus-related information)


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**Machines In The Garden**

*An old photograph showing a lemon sizer (or grader) installed as an experimental model in the Prenda Packing House of the Arlington Heights Fruit Co., 1892.*
In 1895, according to the Bradstreet Index, Riverside, California was the richest city per capita in the United States, her wealth directly attributable to the Washington Navel Orange business. That industry covered 20,000 acres of the best irrigated land in the Riverside area in the year 1895. Promotional literature boasted that Riverside had become literally the garden of California, a veritable horticultural paradise. One trade and commerce publication argued: "The population of the city . . . is, socially, of an exceptionally high order, as evidenced by their refined and beautiful homes, their splendid educational system, and the wise and economical administration of the municipal government."

Riverside, like the biblical Eden, however, was populated by human beings complete with all their natural strengths and weaknesses. The city thus held out opportunities for enterprising people of a competitive nature with a willingness to work hard (and sometimes to be ruthless). One major opportunity lay in the area of developing efficient machinery to help process the incredible expansion of citrus production in California. Mass shipment of perishable citrus commodities and the conversion of manufacturing from custom smithed tools to machine shop built equipment, therefore, converged in Riverside around 1900 with astounding results. Two men, in the process, grappled, fought, and built manufacturing empires. These mechanical wizards, Fred Stebler and George Parker, turned Riverside—the Garden—into the world center for the construction of citrus packing equipment. Many

Vincent Moses is Curator of History with the Riverside Municipal Museum in Riverside, California. This article arose out of research he conducted in preparation for the museum’s exhibit, "Oranges for Health—California for Wealth:" The Riverside (Washington) Navel Orange and the California Dream, 1880-1980. The exhibition will remain in place through 1982 with occasional minor changes.
Fred Stebler and his improved fruit separator (opposite) which was patented in 1916. It soon became a standard item in California packing houses.

critics in the citrus industry argued that Stebler and Parker by 1921 had actually formed a tight monopoly over the manufacture of citrus machinery.²

George Parker’s mammoth crate nailing machines, after all, dominated the market the world over. Those devices flowed steadily from the precision operated Parker Machine Works, known officially by that name since 1909, with little or no serious competition until Hale Paxton entered the picture in the 1920s. By contrast, Fred Stebler’s California Iron Works (C.I.W.) held preeminence in the manufacture of machinery to handle and process citrus fruit, from the grove to the refrigerated rail car.

Fred Stebler was born in Iowa December 28; 1870 of Swiss immigrant parents. Altogether, he had roughly three months of formal schooling. Most of his “learnin” came through the “school of hard knocks.” Indicative of this fact were the years spent in the Dakota Territory living in a three-sided lean-to. Fred also limped all his life as the result of a broken hip received from a fall out of a hay rick. The break was not set properly but instead healed on its own. At age twenty, Stebler became an apprentice machinist and obtained eight years experience with different shops before his arrival in California.³

On July 5, 1899, at age twenty-eight, Fred Stebler stepped off the train into the streets of Riverside. He shortly bought a half interest in the Crawford and Fay Machine Shop and by 1902 became sole proprietor. In 1903, he took in Austin Gamble and they associated under the title of California Iron Works. This partnership lasted until 1909 when Stebler again became sole owner of C.I.W. His second sole proprietorship held until January 1, 1921.⁴

By the end of his career, Stebler had obtained around forty patents on various fruit processing apparatus. Among those devices were sizers, conveyors, washers, dryers, clamp trucks, elevators, dumpers, labelers, railroad car squeezers, separators, and fruit distributors. A great deal of Stebler’s success derived from his close work with fruit packers early in this century. Their work together gradually led to a standardized packline layout. The final layout, of course, usually contained a large percentage of Stebler machinery. Along with the fruit distributor, conveyors, and other patent items, Stebler’s fruit sizers dominated packlines in most citrus packing houses up to the consolidation with George Parker.

Despite a high degree of success, Stebler and his machinery were not always universally appreciated.
This attitude arose partly from what contemporaries described as Stebler's abrasive and cantankerous personality, and partly from his autocratic business practices. F.N. Dunbar, Manager of La Mesa Packing Company, Riverside, wrote to a packer in Orange County as early as 1909 concerning Stebler and C.I.W. machinery. Dunbar complained: "We long ago, learned better than to expect the machinery that he put out to be properly constructed. We also learned that unless you wanted to be insulted it was not best to go to him with any complaints or suggestions . . . . I suppose that if it were impossible for us to obtain machinery elsewhere we might call on Mr. Stebler, otherwise, never."

In 1909, the year Stebler became sole proprietor of C.I.W., George Parker opened his Parker Machine Works. Initially he made only the huge nailing apparatus, but encouraged by Stebler's critics, such as F.N. Dunbar, Parker entered the field of citrus processing machinery in direct competition with C.I.W. He ultimately gained patents on sizers, separators, conveyors, washers, dumpers, and elevators and with them cut into Stebler's market. The legal fur really flew. Stebler accused Parker of intentional and willful disregard of Stebler patents and sued him at every opportunity. The litigation continued unabated for ten years. Riverside's paper hardly went a day without reporting a charge or counter charge lodged by one or the other of these warriors. As Tom Patterson, journalist and local historian stated: "The titans described each other in Corral Five language."

Ruinous losses incurred through this constant patent litigation, coupled with a post war economic slump, led W.B. Clancy, President of Citizens National Bank, to persuade the two war horses to consolidate their citrus processing machinery businesses. The merger became official January 1, 1921 under the title The Stebler-Parker Company. Parker retained his nailing machine line over at the Parker Machine Works.7 Years later Stebler commented on the merger:

This was not as satisfactory as I would have liked . . . . However, this arrangement was desirable because it eliminated the terrible expense we had both been through because of the continued litigation arising out of patent controversies, almost all of which were brought about by his insisting on appropriating my exclusive rights to inventions most of which were my own inventions.

He went on to argue that: "While I was successful in all cases of litigation against him, this did not stop him, so it was a case of vital importance that I resort to other means, which was this combination."8

Even the critics, however, had to admit that Stebler's C.I.W. had been preeminent in the design and manufacture of citrus processing equipment. Moreover, most of the patents on C.I.W. machinery had been sustained in court. The merger, therefore, occurred for reasons of economic survival. Herein-af ter presented are descriptions of the three more hotly disputed patented machines from the C.I.W. repertoire, 1900 to 1921.

C.I.W. MECHANICAL FRUIT SIZER

Grades and sizes of fruit are still important in the marketing of citrus commodities. The machinery used to size fruit is axiomatic in all modern packing houses, but this was not the case around 1900. Fred Stebler's entry into the problem of efficient citrus sizing resulted in the design and patenting of an improved labor saving fruit sizer. James R. Rogers, Solicitor of Patents and Infringement Lawyer from Los Angeles, sent Stebler his Letters Patent #709,613, dated September 23, 1902 on September 29, of that same year. The Patent Office had granted Stebler all nine claims for his fruit grader (sizer).9

“This invention relates to apparatus for sizing or grading fruit,” the Letters Patent acknowledged.
and was discharged laterally from the sizer into a waiting bin.\footnote{11}

Today, the state of the art in fruit sizing is possible because of Stebler's early efforts. FMC Corporation's latest apparatus, the Tri-Roll Sizer, is an indirect descendant of Stebler's 1902 Rope and Roll model.

C.I.W. FRUIT DISTRIBUTOR

Stebler invented other sizing devices including the drop-roll fruit and olive sizer (1942), but according to his own words, found inked along the margin of his Letters Patent (received December 21, 1909) the Distributing Apparatus "was of grater [sic] importance to me and made more money than any other and was sustained in court."\footnote{12} Further evidence in Stebler's handwriting in the margins of this Letters Patent establishes that his court reference was in regard to a major lawsuit against George Parker for patent infringement. Stebler apparently won this case outright and the device made him a lot of money.

According to Stebler's Letters Patent: "This invention relates to means for carrying or distributing fruit, and is particularly designed for use in connection with a fruit sizer or grader, and has for its general object the provision of simple and efficient means whereby the several grades or sizes of fruits, such . . . as oranges, may be conducted to wide bins suitably spaced along the floor of a packing house so as to provide sufficient room at the sides of the bins for the fruit packers to work."\footnote{13} The apparatus was also designed to work well in tandem with a short or small grader or sizer, "and still deliver the separated or sized fruit in bins of such width as to provide easy access . . . for packers." Moreover, if oranges were running heavily to one or two sizes, the conveyor was capable of depositing a single size fruit into several adjacent bins for efficient handling. The machine came with adjustable partitions for the bins to suit the packers' immediate requirements for bin
Smudge Pot (Orchard Heater) Maker. Manufactured for Riverside Sheet Metal Works by Stebler-Parker Co. to help them meet the increased demand for orchard heaters that developed in the wake of the 1913 freeze.

Rail Car Squeezer (Squeeze) c.1925. This device was developed by Stebler’s California Iron Works as a way to facilitate the loading of full orange crates into the standard refrigerated rail car. Crates were loaded and stacked into either end of the car by hand until just enough room remained to accommodate the squeeze. At that point this device was wheeled on board and the steel bumpers were jacked outward to provide a few inches of extra space for the remaining crates.
room to secure the various sizes of fruit.

Stebler’s Distributor was constructed to sit on a slight incline so that gravity would move the fruit down the conveyor line. Tender fruit skins were protected in this way against abrasions that would have resulted from mechanical or forced conveyance down the line. Stebler’s Distributor can be seen in almost every historic packinghouse photograph taken after 1909. It became an overnight success in spite of the disdain many packers held for Stebler himself.

C.I.W. FRUIT SEPARATORS

The worst winter in the history of California citrus growing hit in 1913. That great three-night freeze happened in January and the thermometer at the old Citrus Experiment Station registered lows of 15°F. The lowest temperatures navel orange can handle, without incurring severe damage, are around 27-28°F. Although most of the navel crop was ruined in 1913, some of the crop would have been salvageable. But how? No effective method had yet been devised!

At this point, Frank F. Chase, one of the founders of National Orange Company, experimented with water separation based upon the specific gravity of citrus fruit. The idea was that undamaged fruit would sink and frosted fruit would tend to float. Chase apparently placed the initial concept into the public domain. In 1915, however, Chase assigned his rights to an improvement in the basic design to Fred Stebler. The improved fruit separator was patented December 26, 1916 as #1,209,900. It soon became a standard item in California packing houses.

The object of this invention, aside from making C.I.W. more money, was to “overcome inaccuracies in the separation of fruit bodies of different sizes, shapes, and specific gravities . . . regardless of their size and shape . . .” A further object was to provide a way of submerging all the “fruit bodies singly and in predetermined spaced relations to one another to a common point in the circulating liquid and release all the fruit bodies from submersion at said common point in advance of the separating member . . .” Common point submersion was induced so that the fruit would rise accurately according to its specific gravity at predetermined angles so as to pass over or under the separating member. In this manner, frost damaged citrus would be effectively separated from good fruit. This patent principle eventually became the standard for frost damaged fruit separators and later was manufactured by Food Machinery Corporation as well as by C.I.W. and the Stebler-Parker Company before F.M.C.

Although John Brown and James Boyd, History of San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, stated in 1922 that the merger of Stebler and Parker was deemed beneficial to the industry, citrus packers came to view the event in a different light. Many of them felt the Stebler-Parker Company, in tandem with Parker Machine Works, constituted a real monopoly on the manufacture of citrus machinery. As Dana Keech, former patent attorney for Hale Paxton and later in Food Machinery Corporation, related in an interview: “The California Citrus League, made up of the California Fruit Growers Exchange (Sunkist), Mutual Orange Distributors (Pure Gold), and American Fruit Growers (Blue Goose), considered the Stebler-Parker Company a monopoly based on their control of patents.” As Keech went on to say, “The Citrus League considered this a heavy burden on packers. The League wanted a free market in citrus machinery so packers could not be compelled to purchase non-patented accessories just in order to obtain one item of patented equipment.”

Keech had gone to work for the California Citrus League in 1926 as Packing House Equipment Development Manager. His job as a patent lawyer
was to investigate the Stebler-Parker patents and to stimulate competition in the citrus machinery market. He was authorized to do this in order to break what the Citrus League viewed as the "stranglehold Stebler-Parker had on the industry." One of the methods at his disposal involved the filing of patent applications by competitors of machinery made by Stebler-Parker Company and Parker Machine Works. Keech would review and file appropriate competing patent applications for a fifteen percent royalty payment to the Citrus League. In order to accomplish his goal, Keech compiled a list of all manufacturers of food machinery in the United States. By 1928 he had made contact with John Bean Manufacturing Company, Sprague-Sells Corporation, and Anderson-Barngrover Manufacturing Company, and had invited them to Southern California to inspect the citrus industry. The intent was to get them interested in entering citrus machinery manufacturing in competition with Stebler-Parker.18

Unfortunately, according to Keech, his idea backfired (here the record gets hazy). The three big companies accepted his invitation, but somewhere along the line decided among themselves that a merger into one large corporation made more sense than expanding their competitive lines against one another. Sometime in early 1929, the major packers of California were invited to the Elite Restaurant in Los Angeles for dinner and a discussion of the Riverside monopoly and how a new Food Machinery Corporation could help packers. At that dinner meeting, Ogden Sells, Sprague-Sells Manufacturing Company, made an impressive case for the new corporation and how it would help modernize equipment lines to suit the packing house needs of the future. As Keech pointed out, all Sells wanted was to get the go ahead for this proposed corporation to purchase the "monopoly" in Riverside! "They went for it lock, stock, and barrel," Keech said, "and wound up with a bigger monopoly yet."19

The corporate merger was consummated in late spring of 1929 after Stebler convinced Parker of the wisdom in selling to the new conglomerate. Parker was happy to sell. His Machine Works business was taking more and more of his time anyway due to a new patent war over nailing machines. Hale Paxton, Dana Keech's future client, had invaded Parker's territory with abandon. The legal sparks flew once again, but no longer in the realm of citrus processing equipment. The new Food Machinery Corporation saw to that. Fred Stebler was named manager.

The July 1929 issue of The California Citrograph carried a full page ad announcing the formation of Food Machinery Corporation through the consolidation of the Stebler-Parker Company with John Bean Manufacturing Company, Anderson-Barngrover Manufacturing Company, and the Sprague-Sells Corporation. Then in the October issue of the Citrograph, an ad appeared geared to reassuring citrus packers that Food Machinery Corporation would live up to Ogden Sells' promise. The ad read in part: "Our plans call for a definite program of progress and cooperation. Progress in the development of fruit handling equipment to keep pace with the ever-growing demand for speed, efficiency, and quality output."20

By late October 1929, Stebler and the other "Food" leaders had managed to purchase the Pioneer Brush Company and Roberts and Huntington Company to consolidate with Stebler-Parker Company under the title, Citrus Machinery Company, a Division of Food Machinery Corporation. Those firms comprised the only real competitors to Stebler-Parker Company and were now a part of the conglomerate. Further, under Fred Stebler's management, the existing patents were improved and so was Food Machinery Corporation's hold on
the citrus machinery market. In 1936, after George Parker's death (1931), FMC purchased the Parker Machine Works and patent rights in an estate liquidation sale. A short time later in 1936 they negotiated the purchase of the Paxton Nailing Machine Company. Food Machinery Corporation, Citrus Machinery Division, under Fred Stebler thereby gained almost airtight control over every major aspect of citrus machinery production.

Fred Stebler retired as manager of Food Machinery Corporation, Citrus Machinery Division, in 1937, though he maintained close contact with the organization for years afterward. From time to time, the company bought inventions from him. One in particular, the drop-roll olive sizer (1941-42), became quite successful. The patent application and purchase agreement were handled by none other than Dana Keech who was then patent attorney for FMC. By contrast, Stebler's nemesis, George Parker, died in 1931 at age fifty-two while embroiled in yet another patent suit, and Hale Paxton suffered a fatal heart attack in 1937. At the time he was Manager of the Nailing Machine Division of Food Machinery Corporation and only thirty-eight years old. Stebler himself died in 1957 after profiting mightily on capital increases in his FMC stock—he was eighty-six years old.

All of the photographs are courtesy of the Riverside Municipal Museum.

Notes

1. Trade and Commerce Pamphlet, Riverside Municipal Museum Archive (c. 1895).
3. Ibid.
6. Patterson, "Three 2-Fisted Inventors," # 3.
7. Interview with Roy Haglund, retired vice president with the Citizens National Bank, Riverside, California, March 1980. Mr. Haglund also serves as the president of the Riverside Historical Society.
8. Quoted in Patterson, "Three 2-Fisted Inventors," # 4 (March 5, 1959).
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Interview with Dana Keech, June 9, 1981, Riverside Municipal Museum Conference Room. Interview conducted by the author.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The California Citrograph (October 1929): 534.
"The Orange-Grower is not a Farmer"¹

G. Harold Powell, Riverside Orchardists, and the Coming of Industrial Agriculture, 1893–1930

by H. Vincent Moses

"This is one of the wealthiest towns in California and the very heart of the orange business. . . . The business has developed on an enormous plan. . . . Around this place are 20,000 acres of oranges representing an investment of 30 million dollars."

G. Harold Powell, Letters from the Orange Empire (1904), 34, 37

At the turn of the century, Riverside, California, existed almost exclusively for the production of Washington navel oranges. Supported by scores of mobile and propertyless migrant workers from the periphery of capitalism, Riverside possessed great wealth and a carefully projected image of refined gentility. The town’s grower elite personified economist Thorstein Veblen’s leisure class, engaging regularly in such noble pursuits as polo, golf, and tennis. Riverside’s citrus packers and shippers sent more than five thousand rail carloads of oranges to eastern markets every year, returning premium prices from the consistently high quality of their fruit. Yet along with other citrus shipping areas of the state, they complained that as much as twenty-five percent of all their fruit decayed while in transit to eastern selling points. If that was true, despite the lucrative nature of the industry, growers were losing hundreds of thousands of dollars. Over and over again, they hammered the United States Department of Agriculture and the University of California for scientific assistance in solving this vexing and costly problem. Finally responding in January 1904, the Department of Agriculture dispatched its most able and celebrated transportation and refrigeration investigator to Riverside on a reconnaissance expedition. G. Harold Powell, protégé of Cornell University’s Liberty Hyde Bailey and a rising star in the Bureau of Plant Industry, came with a well-honed team of equally youthful and precocious agricultural scientists dead set on solving the growers’ decay problem.²

In February, Powell wrote to his wife, Gertrude, from the new Glenwood Mission Inn in Riverside. His hectic day had involved many introductions to influential people, he said, including “the Chamber of Commerce, Board of Trade and a delegation of packers and growers.” Further, Powell boasted, “there were not less than ten million dollars invested here by the men present.” He confidently assessed the prospects of this situation for his career. “You can hardly appreciate how much this means,” he told her, “as there is no class of people in the east who approach the orange growers in intelligence and large business affairs.”³

These insightful personal observations proved more prescient than either he or Riverside’s orchardists realized. In short order, Powell and his team
By the early twentieth century, with the citrus industry firmly established in southern California, towns such as Riverside, Redlands, Ontario, and San Bernardino cultivated an aesthetic image. Picturesque panoramas such as this one, with a snow-capped Mount Baldy rising in the distance, were typical of the inland valley landscape. These scenes also inspired much orange-crate label art, several examples of which appear on the covers and elsewhere in this issue. Courtesy California Historical Society/Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce Photograph Collection, University of Southern California.

determined the cause and the solution to the growers’ problem. Within four years his recommendations transformed the entire industry. He proposed industrial solutions involving labor practices, packinghouse machinery and management structure, and general business methods. Growers and packers adopted his suggestions almost on the spot. Not a single one in any documentation I have found opposed him on agrarian principles. They accepted Powell’s industrial interpretation of their problems, even though most had expected him to approach the decay issue as a fruit pathology question.

Powell’s work with the growers holds the key to one of the primary historiographical mysteries surrounding twentieth-century agriculture. In most conventional analyses, farmers and rural regions openly and in a mobilized fashion fought urban industrialization. As Jacksonian free-market capitalists, they were dragged kicking and screaming into twentieth-century modes of organization and social order by a coalition of federal, state, private, and academic forces, often as late as the New Deal era. On the other hand, Harvey Mudd College’s Hal S. Barron, like historian Lawrence Goodwyn, main-
study confirms that at least one segment of American agriculture joined the organizational revolution from its very outset. Orange growers formed a self-aware class of new agricultural capitalists, no less self-assured than Goodwyn’s self-motivated anti-corporate Farmers’ Alliance of the 1880s.

By the early 1890s, Riverside orange growers thought like and behaved like full-fledged industrial capitalists. Over the period from 1890 to 1920, they shaped citrus production in southern California into a vertically integrated cartel of great economic prowess and efficiency, rivaling any in the industrialized Northeast. Unlike their anti-industrial dirt-farming brethren in the Farmers’ Alliance and Populist People’s Party of 1892, Riverside growers and their cohort group in other citrus towns met historian Eric Foner’s definition of “Reconstructed Republicans,” more at home with cooperation and organization than with the rugged individualism of traditional Jeffersonian yeomen. While elsewhere large segments of the farming population were in outright rebellion against industrialization, citrus growers embraced it.

In the beginning, even advocates of family farming believed that citrus production would save farming as a way of life in California. In irrigated citrus production, they saw the long-sought-after hope of a state dominated by small family farmers upholding republican values in a classless countryside. The relatively lucrative fruit cultures offered a viable alternative to the capital-intensive, large-scale “bonanza” wheat farms. A five-acre orange grove, for instance, often returned profits equal to the average two-hundred-acre Midwest farm. Given this fact, the development of a middle-class agrarian society in California seemed assured by the citrus industry. Riverside appeared to many, including some of its founders, to embody the agrarians’ dreams of a classless countryside of small freeholder yeomanry. Riverside, however, emerged by 1895 as the per-
capita wealthiest town in the United States. As the heart of the emerging southern California citrus belt, Riverside in the 1890s nestled serenely within 20,000 acres of navel oranges, representing a cumulative total investment by 1904 of thirty million dollars. In 1896, Riverside’s prosperous orange growers voted overwhelmingly for Republican presidential candidate William McKinley, flying in the face of their farming brethren in the Midwest and South and aligning themselves instead with the forces of industrialization. Four years later, the total dollar figure accrued from ten years of orange sales reached $21,025,490.

By the time Powell visited the city in 1904, Riverside growers had already fought and resolved difficult irrigation and water-rights battles, creating in their wake associative and cooperative solutions that helped lay the legal basis for California water doctrine. They had also established the most effective producer-owned agricultural marketing cooperative in the United States, enabling them to lift the region into an accelerated economic take-off. The California Fruit Growers Exchange (Sunkist) operated more like a citrus trust than an instrument of agrarian reform. With Powell’s leadership, growers also successfully lobbied the legislature for creation of the Citrus Experiment Station in Riverside by the University of California. These same growers supported the innovation of modern packinghouse technology by two local competing machinists, Fred Stebler and George Parker, resulting ultimately in the conversion of citrus packing to full-blown assembly-line organization.

The labor-intensive nature of citriculture, moreover, pulled a succession of diverse immigrants to the city and region, adding new dimensions to California’s well-documented tradition of ethnic diversity. First came the Chinese, then the Japanese, and finally the Mexicans looking to escape revolution in their homeland. Yet Riverside’s approach to agricultural labor, like the remainder of the commercialized fruit-growing communities, reflected the class structure of industrial capitalism and the racial politics of the era. Their acceptance of the prevailing Social Darwinian assumptions allowed growers to rationalize the industrial nature of their labor system. What happened to the agrarian utopia of small family farms making a modest profit while sacrificing for the greater community good predicted by reformers? In fact, Riverside’s orange growers diverged from the rank-and-file of America’s farmers and even the agrarian reformers in California and reorganized their production along models derived from modern corporate organizations.

Since historians Ellis Hawley and Martin J. Sklar identified and described the rise of what scholars have called “corporate liberalism,” or the advocating of administered markets under corporate control, much scholarship has gone into elaborating its impact on the political economy of the nation and into defining its boundaries of influence. The creation of a pro-corporate sector of capitalists, corporate liberalism, according to Sklar, arose in the wake of what business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., identified as the rise of a “new form of capitalism.” According to Chandler, the new capitalism ushered in the Second Capitalist Revolution, bringing “into being a new economic institution, the managerial business enterprise, and a new subspecies of economic man, the salaried manager.” This analysis, however, has never been extended to agriculture. Farming has generally remained outside the analysis of corporations and the coming of the new capitalism. Historians have generally seen farmers early in this century as reluctant to accept industrial methods because they considered those methods and the values they represented a threat to farming as a way of life.

The leading advocates of corporate liberalism, however, did not limit their efforts to the world of northeastern factories and giant industrial corporations, and here begins the answer to the conundrum posed by Hal S. Barron. According to many scholars of the Progressive Era, thinkers and modernizing politicians such as Teddy Roosevelt, Liberty Hyde Bailey, Kenyon Butterfield, and Benjamin Ide Wheeler turned their attention, as well, to America’s rural areas. The countryside, they argued, had to be modernized also. By definition, that meant the industrialization of American agriculture through the application of scientific methods, better education, and cooperative organization along corporate lines. While, according to historian David Danbom, vast numbers of farmers resisted these attempts to industrialize agriculture, a group of dedicated government, academic, and corporate thinkers pushed ahead with the program, undaunted by the opposition of farmers or anyone else. Led primarily by the United States Department of Agriculture and President Roosevelt’s Country Life Commission,
these agrarian industrializers hoped to make the nation’s unorganized, individualistic farmers as efficient and modern as their urban industrial counterparts. According to Danbom, agrarian modernizers believed the country’s status as a world power and its ability to reach its full economic potential depended upon bringing agriculture into line with the forces of efficiency and production embodied by the new corporation.23 Beverly T. Galloway, G. Harold Powell’s boss at the USDA’s Bureau of Plant Industry, reckoned in this regard that “the farm and the factory must go side by side, in order to bring about the greatest progressive, intellectual, and industrial development.”24

As the youthful and ambitious Powell found upon his arrival in Riverside in 1904, however, no agrarian resistance materialized among the citrus fruit growers in southern California. Instead, these aggressive horticulturists were “anxious to cooperate and appreciate scientific experiments more than any other class” he had met.25 They were concerned above all with promoting their own business interests, which to them also defined the present and future well-being of the region. At stake, however, would be nothing short of the direction agriculture would take on a national level. Would it remain the stronghod of the family farmer practicing agriculture as a way of life while adhering to republican values? On the other hand, would it continue as the realm of Jacksonian small entrepreneurial capitalism, clutching onto a sense of independence and autonomy in the face of organized industrial capital? Or did these palpably pro-corporate orange growers represent the next definition of farming in America?

**Orange Growers as Revolutionary Capitalists**

For decades after he proclaimed it in 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis,” which celebrated western settlement as the shaping force of American democracy, dominated the scholarly interpretation of the American West. Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, many historians began to dispute Turner’s specific findings, and more recently, over the last two decades a coterie of “New Western Historians” have rejected Turner’s framework of analysis altogether.26 To these often passionate historians, the western region has become alternately a province “plundered” by outside interests and a lost opportunity for advancing egalitarian democracy. Generally, neither the original Turnerian framework nor these recent critics saw western development as the product of a self-conscious local leadership elite working from a positive value structure to generate the region in its own image. More often, in the “new” histories at least, western history has appeared as a saga of villainy and outside greed intent upon exploiting the West by means of extractive industries, in a self-serving manner, on behalf of eastern corporate and political interests.27

By the nature of the semi-arid environment of California and much of the Far West, however, settlement of this region required much more intense cooperation and capital than other more humid areas. Even Turner recognized these changed circumstances. In this region, he argued, settlement had to abandon pioneering individualism in favor of collective action.28 Turner felt that, from the onset of settlement, the arid region would have to develop as an industrial domain and not as an extension of the fee-simple empire of rugged, individualistic small farmers. “The pioneer of the arid regions... must be both a capitalist and a protégé of the government,” Turner argued.29 His new West would produce a kind of collective “social,” rather than “individual,” democracy. William Smythe, a leading evangelist of irrigated agriculture and irrigation technology, concurred with Turner. Smythe, as historian Donald Worster claims, “pointedly celebrated irrigation as an agricultural counterpart to industrial organization.” In the book *Conquest of Arid America*, whose very title suggested the militant qualities of his crusade, Smythe referred to the irrigated West as industrial, not agrarian, foreshadowing what California’s citrus-growing region was fast becoming.30

Orange growers followed the revised Turnerian and Smythean models. As primary users of irrigation water, growers led the battle over water rights in California, writing legislation to modify the riparian doctrines of English common law. In particular, Riverside growers pressed their claims in the legislature and the courts over several decades in the latter half of the nineteenth century.31 Citriculture, above all other agricultural enterprises, validated the faith of irrigation evangelists such as William Smythe, Elwood Mead, and Ray Lyman Wilbur. Citrus growers, therefore, aided by agrarian reformers such as Judge John W. North, the founder of River-

26 CALIFORNIA HISTORY
side, and the California Irrigation Congress, pushed in the courts and the legislature for private forms of capital ownership and government mechanisms to assist irrigators in stabilizing water law and distribution rights. They envisioned their efforts as a means of ensuring equitable land distribution and economic development.  

Carey McWilliams’s first-hand account, composed two generations ago, of the powerful role of the citrus growers in the development of water management and law, confirms that special problems surrounding the formation and cultivation of the citrus industry—particularly those associated with marketing a perishable product across long distances—compelled pioneering growers to adopt a high degree of associative effort. Moreover, citrus growers, as a result of these problems and their cooperative efforts to solve them, achieved levels of technological development substantially in advance of other agricultural enterprises in the country. They engineered innovative methods of irrigation, experimented with and developed frost-protection methods, organized and lobbied the state for scientific research to solve the many pest-related problems engendered by citrus monoculture, helped evolve revolutionary cooling and refrigeration processes, and above all, proactively organized and promoted a national market for California citrus using modern industrial forms of business organization.  

McWilliams’s observations of early organization among growers takes on more significance when viewed from the perspective of the influential men who embraced corporate liberalism. Their quick and decisive organized moves placed them at the forefront of industrial agriculture and imply that they were very early in taking up a dialogue with large-scale organizational society. By contrast, the Farmers’ Alliance and the Populist People’s Party organized for the purpose of restoring the older world of small-scale, competitive entrepreneurial
capitalism tempered by egalitarian measures, and
not to build a new industrial superstructure among
America’s farmers. The citrus-grower elite, on the
other hand, fought vigorously and finally success-
fully to bring that superstructure about in southern
California.

Rapid organization of southern California’s citrus
industry under a corporate form originated and
was sustained because the social class that de-
veloped it came from the heart of the new capitalism.
Many of the growers were, in fact, captains of industry.
This view has been substantiated by no less than
eyewitness observers such as Charles Fletcher
Lummis, Professor and Dean of the University of
California College of Agriculture E. J. Wickson, and
Professor J. E. Coit, as well as writer Carey
McWilliams. Contrary to Turner’s earlier frontier
tamers, few of those who became citrus growers had
ever been real dirt farmers. Instead, McWilliams
argued, “the greatest number” of them came from the
stores, counting-houses, shops, and offices of their
homes in the eastern states,” or were “[l]awyers, who
had fled the stifling air of the courtroom.” Judge
North’s Southern California Colony Association,
for example, which in the 1870s established River-
side and navel-orange culture, listed among its
membership five lawyers, a similar number of physici-
ans, a druggist, and six successful businessmen.

Founders of the citrus-belt colonies, particularly
in Riverside, were principally transplanted Yankees
and middle-westerners. This proves important from
the standpoint of corporate agriculture, since the
impetus for the birth of Alfred Chandler’s new form
of capitalism originated with the increasingly indus-
trialized Northeast and, according to Eric Foner,
primarily through the reconstructed Republican Party,
by the 1890s the party of the new corporate industrialists.
Moreover, the leadership elite “in all the
citrus-belt towns” arose out of mainstream evangelical
Protestantism—Congregationalists, Northern Bap-
tists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. From the vant-
age point of their evangelical backgrounds, the
imposition of order constituted part and parcel of a
civilizing mission, as they saw it, including forma-
tion and organized disciplining of a mass labor force
from the pre-industrial periphery of capitalism.

From the outset of the citrus industry in Riverside,
as McWilliams and others have indicated, the grow-
ers “made more extensive use of modern business
methods . . . than any other aspect of American agri-
culture.” Citrus growers, particularly in Riverside,
as heirs of the world left by the earlier evangelical
bourgeoisie, provided the self-assured leadership to
meet the organizational society head-on in southern
California. In Riverside, several men exemplified the
conclusions of McWilliams, Coit, Wickson, Cleland,
and other eyewitness observers and, by their con-
tributions to the industrialization of citiculture,
confirmed the corporate liberal thesis in agriculture,
at least citrus agriculture. Among the local leaders
were Ethan Allen Chase, C. E. Rumsey, Stephen H.
Herrick, and L. W. Brown.

Ethan Allen Chase moved to Riverside in 1891 at
fifty-nine years of age from Rochester, New York.
There, he and his brothers had built one of the
largest nursery businesses in the state, specializing
in orchard stock. Chase had no intention of leaving
that business to embark upon a new one in the Far
West when he first visited the citrus colony. Over
the next twenty years, however, Chase turned his con-
siderable talents to the work of growing and mar-
ting navel oranges. In 1901, he and his three sons,
along with three other partners, established a closed-
stock corporation, capitalized at $800,000, to buy the
best citrus land and to grow the best fruit that could
be scientifically cultivated. Their National Orange
Company quickly gained a first-rate reputation in
eastern markets. By 1904, the Chases owned more
than 1,600 acres of navel in the Riverside–Highgrove
district and 1,200 acres in nearby Corona, south of
Riverside. Chase played a significant role in sup-
porting the work of G. Harold Powell from his
arrival in Riverside in 1904 through Chase’s death
in 1921.

Millionaire Cornelius Earle Rumsey, former trea-
surer of the National Biscuit Company, arrived in
Riverside around 1899 and immediately gained
prominence among growers and shippers, as he had
in the board rooms of eastern corporations. Rumsey
earned a reputation for experimentation in citrus
production and for participation in local civic
improvements. In 1905, he delivered a lecture at the
Loring Theatre on civic improvements entitled “Ev-
olution of a Tourist,” in which he expressed his atti-
dude toward the community and orange growing.
“My first purchase,” he said, “was ten acres of ten-
year old Navels, costing $18,000. Five years . . . show
an excellent investment. Then the fun to plant, to
take no man’s ready-made, hand-me-down grove,
to redeem sage brush and sand and glorify it as oth-
ers had done, to have a hand in creation, to say ‘Let it blossom’; and it was done! To say ‘Let it fruit’; and it was done! To look at the transformation and feel that you have helped make California... Riverside has given the joy, and has paid the bill.” Rumsey joyfully welcomed G. Harold Powell and promoted his work with vigor from the very beginning of the Powell method for curing the decay problem. Rumsey even built a custom packinghouse dedicated to careful handling of fruit according to the Powell method.

Stephen Henderson Herrick, a well-known Iowa banker, migrated to Riverside in the mid-1880s. A founding member of a number of packing and water companies, Herrick helped pioneer the prototype local citrus marketing cooperative, Pachappa Orange Growers Association, which later evolved into the California Fruit Growers Exchange. He also served as president of the Citizens National Bank of Riverside, the East Riverside Land Company, the East Highlands Water Company, and as a member of the board of the Gage Canal Company. Herrick's Iowa Syndicate funded the construction of Riverside jeweler Matthew Gage's visionary and technically sophisticated irrigation canal to its first terminus at the Tequesquite Arroyo. His sound-money policies won him a high reputation among the nation's bankers and Riverside's growers.

L.V.W. Brown, son of Riverside co-founder Judge E.G. Brown, attended Stanford University and Cornell College of Agriculture, excelling in horticulture and entomology. Brown helped provide a warm welcome to fellow Cornellian G. Harold Powell upon his arrival in Riverside in 1904 to undertake decay research on behalf of the growers. Brown became one of the first to adopt Powell's careful handling methods in his packinghouse. One of the largest and most enterprising growers in southern California, Brown farmed hundreds of acres of his own and managed hundreds more for others. He served one term as a city trustee and was elected mayor in 1921.

Chase, Rumsey, Herrick, Brown, and fellow growers were joined by the Riverside Trust Company, Ltd., a British syndicate that funded the extension of Gage's canal south to its ultimate terminus near Corona. This British corporate enterprise irrigated over 3,000 acres of groves with Gage Canal water from 1891 through 1928. The Arlington Heights District, which they farmed, constituted one of the finest navel orange and lemon regions in the world. Along with the British syndicate, Riverside's Yankee growers were, as Powell said in 1904, "people of large affairs." Time after time in his letters, the class-conscious Powell marveled at the apparent savoir-faire and business acumen of these growers. Wealthy, well educated, and determined, they possessed, in Powell's eyes, a refined sense of confidence and moral rectitude.

Millionaire Cornelius Earle Rumsey, ca. 1905, confirmed the argument that the orange grower was not a dirt farmer. Owner of the Alta Cresta Citrus Company in Riverside, Rumsey recognized the wisdom of Powell's handling methods and in 1908 built a new packinghouse that he dedicated to the USDA, Powell, and the careful handling of citrus fruit. Courtesy City of Riverside Museum.
Industrialization and consolidation did not put them off as it had those in the state with a more agrarian outlook on agriculture and its role in society. One of their own, Fred Reed, son of the elder John Henry Reed, revealed growers’ pro-urban class consciousness when he argued from his local whig perspective that:

Had the leaders of this colony been of the usual type of conservative eastern or European farmer there would not have been any story of their achievements worth telling, . . . but the use of irrigation and the production of new crops and products made a clean page in the history of agriculture. . . . They were able to apply their minds to overcoming new problems and under quite new circumstances.43

Eyewitness accounts, in fact, nearly all emphasized that turn-of-the-century Riverside orange growers were not typical farmers. Reed, obviously reflecting a class bias representative of these same growers, revealed in the thought that citrus men, unlike more traditional farmers, were not shackled to superstition.

Riverside Orange Growers and Regional Economic Growth

Riverside’s contributions to the industrialization of agriculture were matched by the town’s role in the accelerated economic take-off of southern California.44 The chief catalyst for both came in the form of a serendipitous discovery in the 1870s of a winter-ripening navel orange, enabling Riversiders to build a powerful export economy for themselves and the region.45 Within ten years, this orange, perfectly suited for the natural conditions in southern California’s inland valleys, altered the direction of California agriculture and spawned a second “gold rush,” one that proved more enduring than the first.46 The regional growth model of Nobel Prize-winning economic historian Douglass C. North makes clear how such phenomenal change could occur from the introduction of two orange trees. In refutation of economist W. W. Rostow, who previously argued that regional economic growth can occur only within urban-industrial matrices, North argues that under certain conditions agricultural commodities, produced for export to other regions or nations, have provided the principal catalyst for “economic growth, the development of external economies, urbanization, and eventually industrial development.”47 Finally, in reply to Rostow and others, North concludes that it is not a matter of “agriculture versus industrialization” but successful integration into national and international markets via an export commodity (or commodities), that determines a region’s “ability to achieve sustained growth and a diversified pattern of economic activity.”48 Economic “take-off” and growth, North argues, are further assured by investment in technological and educational infrastructure, based upon home-owned capital, coupled with investment in education and science. Subsidiary and residential industries arise around the export commodity, and labor and capital flow into the region to take advantage of these developments.49

University of California, Riverside, historians Ronald Tobey and Charles Wetherell, however, do not believe that North’s free-market model alone can account for the rise of the citrus industry and the economic take-off it provided the southern California area. Since citrus agriculture arose within the “Second Capitalist Revolution,” they urge the application of North’s Nobel Prize-winning model as modified by Albert Hirschman’s Strategy of Development, on which North bases his propositions.50 All things being equal, Hirschman considers an organized social cohort of leaders more important to the industrialization and modernization of a region than raw market forces. For him, according to Tobey and Wetherell, the social cohort’s vision and subsequent selection of an appropriate industry for the region will direct its potential for industrialization and will induce a growth mentality in the region.51 Along with Tobey and Wetherell, I believe the citrus growers constituted such a social cohort. The navel orange provided the product, but the growers brought the right pro-corporate industrial mentality to the business.

The way citrus growers are viewed and subsequently interpreted affects the way southern California history is researched and presented. In this regard, the prevailing model for the reading of southern California holds that this area remained a dependent colony of the industrial Northeast, which exploited it by means of extractive industries, until World War II. At that time, defense contracting brought the necessary manufacturing base and infusion of funds to industrialize the region. Until the 1940s, the theory goes, neither citriculture nor any other agricultural endeavor had been able to break this dependency on outside capital nor to forestall
the plunder of the area’s resources. The dependent colony theory, however, does not take into account the phenomenon of the Washington navel orange and the people who grew it.

Riverside, in fact, served as the focal point for a growing seven-county political economy dominated by citrus growers and even larger than Powell first imagined. This regional political economy arose from the lucrative export sector created by the Washington navel orange and related varieties of commercial citrus, including the summer-ripening Valencia orange and the lemon of southern California’s coastal plain and nearby valleys. Rises in land values led to a rapidly enhanced economic infrastructure. Citrus production induced “formation of land companies, irrigation companies, and development corporations,” and the resident growers who made this growth possible intended to keep their money working at home.

**Corporate Consolidation of the Citrus Enterprise**

In 1893, Riverside growers launched a corporate vessel, the Southern California Fruit Exchange, for dealing with their mounting production and marketing problems. By 1905, this producer-owned and managed cooperative organization went statewide, changed its name to the California Fruit Growers Exchange, and began the process of founding local affiliated cooperatives throughout the state. Between 1904 and 1913, the pioneering entrepreneurial leadership of the exchange engineered a campaign to bring the industry under a full-blown corporate format in order to take advantage of economies of scale and efficiency. They fought to bring picking, packing, and marketing under the thumb of the exchange through the local associations. By standardizing the grades of fruit and the methods of
packing, they sought to end the chaos in the market and raise the reliability of their product in the same manner as manufacturing enterprises were doing for non-perishable goods. The exchange registered its trademark, "Sunkist," in the United States Patent Office on January 5, 1909. The same year, Powell wrote to his supervisor at the Bureau of Plant Industry, B.T. Galloway, regarding the strength of the exchange: "These people out here are going to stand together. They have the habit and have learned the benefits. They can pay any amount and can do anything that business judgment suggests. They will sell $15,000,000 of fruit this year, and they can do anything a bank, a railroad, or any other corporation can do. Nerve isn't lacking in the Exchange fibre."

Statistics from exchange's magazine, the California Citograph, indicate that by 1915, with G. Harold Powell serving as the corporation's first professional non-grower manager, the CFGE effectively controlled seventy percent of the fresh oranges and almost one hundred percent of the fresh lemons shipped from California, giving the exchange a virtual monopoly position in the industry. By that time, the exchange had integrated backward, creating the Fruit Growers Supply Company, its own capitalized buying agency and supplier of raw materials, and had just entered the citrus by-products business in Ontario (later moved to Corona). In every aspect of the enterprise, CFGE had achieved what Chandler identified as first-mover status. The exchange no longer competed with other growers and commission merchants on the basis of price but rather fought for market share and profits. Despite General Manager Powell's lament in 1913 regarding the ongoing problems with unregulated competition in the distribution business, the CFGE's position in the markets of the nation presented a stark contrast to the marketing chaos of the 1890s, which had led to the founding of the cooperative in the first place. An analysis by University of Minnesota economist W. W. Cumberland in 1917 revealed that the organization stood on the economic principles of modern corporate business enterprise. The exchange sought to distribute risk and build a marketing network capable of transforming citrus fruits into staple commodities of everyday and universal consumption. Moreover, Cumberland described the exchange as "composed of three kinds of organizations: one to pack the fruit, one to sell it, and one to furnish the facilities for selling." "The growers," he said, "own the packing associations, the packing associations own the district exchanges, and the district exchanges own the central exchange. Therefore the growers own the entire exchange system." If such standing made the CFGE a vertically integrated "trust," growers saw it as a good trust, in the Roosevelt sense of the term, and not a monopolistic exploiter of the consumer.

In 1915, the CFGE represented thousands of member growers. Most of the 208,000 acres under cultivation, moreover, belonged to rank-and-file growers holding an average of five to ten acres. According to W.W. Cumberland (a dyed-in-the-wool agrarian modernizer) and data collected by the Citrus Protective League and the California Fruit Growers Exchange, 12,000 to 15,000 growers of citrus fruits in California employed 25,000 laborers. At the time, the league estimated that the industry provided a living for about 150,000 people. While, according to McWilliams, Lawton, Cumberland, and others, a few commercial ranches, primarily corporations owning thousands of acres each, dominated the exchange, generally a person owning thirty acres was regarded as a large grower. As Cumberland stated in 1917, "these figures seem insignificant to one familiar with the size of the ordinary farm in the United States but it must be remembered that on a value basis even a five acre orange grove at $2,000 an acre compares very favorably with the ordinary middle western farm." Furthermore, Cumberland reasoned, "growing Citrus fruits is, then, distinctly a capitalistic enterprise. . . . To purchase enough desirable property for a satisfactory citrus enterprise there are required a good many thousands of dollars, so it cannot be thought of as an industry that offers many attractions to the poor man." It did, however, offer attractions to the machinist, the banker, the lawyer, the doctor, the business tycoon, and other adventurous entrepreneurs seeking to build up businesses and services around it. Moreover, the industry pushed investment in educational infrastructure and waged an incessant campaign to build a reliable year-round wage labor force.
Residentiary Industries, the Citrus Proletariat, and an Educational Infrastructure

California’s citrus industry met two other tests in the theoretical model of Douglass North. It generated subsidiary and residentiary industries, and it spawned a sophisticated educational infrastructure to back it up and to educate its children.61 As an organized, labor-intensive business enterprise, citrus also produced a system of industrial labor far in advance of any other in agriculture at the time. The citrus culture of the West moved rapidly and consciously toward specialization and division of labor, while plowing the income from its chief export sector back into the region. In this way, and by contrast to the cotton culture of the South, the orange growers of southern California stimulated further regional economic growth and thereby moved more people into the mainstream of the market economy through a wide distribution of income. Growers’ investment in social overhead and infrastructure, including mechanisms for mass distribution, led to an everwidening export base of high-income-yielding horticultural commodities, calling forth commensurate retail and service industries.62

From McWilliams’s vantage point, the phenomenal prowess of the area’s economic dynamo had to be attributed to the success of the California Fruit Growers Exchange. Other intensive horticultural industries in California soon followed the lead of the exchange in organizing themselves into successful export cooperatives. Almond, walnut, raisin, avocado, and deciduous fruit growers of the state had, by Powell’s arrival, attained established positions in the market and were contributing to the growing
investment in the region. In Riverside, several subsidiary and residentiary industries arose out of the primary citrus export sector. They serviced the needs of the growers and took advantage of the massive amounts of capital citrus was bringing into the region. One subsidiary industry dedicated to handling the packinghouse needs of growers, what Hirschman would have called a backward linkage, assumed world-wide significance. The advent of machines in California’s garden—the conversion of manufacturing from custom-smithed machines to machineshop-made equipment—converged with mass shipment of perishable citrus commodities in Riverside. In the early years of the twentieth century this convergence produced a major business enterprise that was both subsidiary and residentiary. Two men grappled, fought, and in the process built manufacturing empires. Mechanical wizards Fred Stebler and George Parker turned Riverside, California, into the world center for the manufacture of citrus packing equipment. Amalgamated as the Stebler-Parker Company in 1921, their business offers yet another piece of evidence for the modern industrial nature of California’s citrus industry. At the behest of packers, the rapid evolution of the packinghouse from field industry to assembly line thus occurred quickly and decisively in Riverside between 1905 and 1929.

The fruit-processing equipment market Stebler and Parker struggled to control arose swiftly in the wake of Powell’s scientific studies on the origin of, and remedy for, decay of oranges in transit to eastern markets. In particular, Powell demonstrated that spoilage in transit could be virtually eliminated through proper picking and processing methods, including the type of clippers used in picking, the size and construction of picking bags, the use of sanitary field boxes, care in transport to the packing shed, and careful handling in the packing process. Once in place, Powell’s prescription saved growers an estimated one and one-half million dollars per year in 1908 dollars. Within four years of Powell’s initial pronouncements, ninety percent of the citrus packinghouses in the state had radically altered their practices and machinery to meet his careful handling recommendations.62

By the end of World War I, the labor practices of California’s citrus producers also clearly reflected the corporate industrial nature of their enterprise. General Manager Powell’s annual reports for 1920–21 articulated the Fruit Growers Exchange’s policy. It embodied practices fundamentally similar to the basics of the Colorado Plan of corporate welfare developed by the Rockefellers to contain labor unrest among workers in their companies. Powell sought year-round residential labor by means of company housing, auto camps, Americanization programs, and a minimal social net for workers and their families. Large corporate ranches within the industry were the first to implement these practices, followed by the district and local exchange associations through cooperative provision of housing and other minimal services. A series of articles in the 1918 California Citrograph detailed the approach of exchange members to residential labor on some of the state’s largest citrus ranches, in particular the Rancho Sespe and the Limoneira Ranch of Ventura County. Luxury housing when compared to most in agricultural industries, these camps featured such amenities as communal baths for Japanese male workers and bunkhouses designed by Pasadena Arts-and-Crafts architects Charles and Henry Greene of Gamble House fame.63

As Cornell economic historian Cletus Daniel reasons in Bitter Harvest, unlike the remainder of American farmers, California horticulturists moved rapidly out of their love affair with agrarian values and the Jeffersonian ideal to embrace the new corporate liberalism of the early twentieth century.64 By the 1880s, according to Daniel, the commercial nature of general California agriculture drove farmers in the state to view farm labor as a factor of production and not as an intrinsic part of Jeffersonian republican tradition. Following on the heels of the transcontinental railroads and an expanding urban market in the East, citrus and other intensive fruit crops overtook the bonanza wheat farms of California’s early American period. These industries, citrus most prominently, and to the consternation of California agrarian reformers, pursued modern industrial approaches to their business after the early 1890s. In this regard, growers soon adopted industrial labor practices not unlike those of the scientific managers of America’s heavy manufacturing enterprises. Aided by their academic and governmental allies, growers found ways and means to justify the wholesale use of labor from the periphery of capitalism.65

While most citrus workers came from pre-industrial folk cultures with little or no experience with
modern industrial conditions or methods of combating those conditions to improve their own status as workers, some, like Japanese field workers, were quick to strike and petition the AFL for membership. This led citrus growers, under the leadership of Powell, to adopt a labor policy that would control and stabilize the highly mobile citrus work force. Subsequently, during Powell's tenure as general manager of the fruit exchange, large commercial ranches began housing their single employees and families in permanent quarters, while rank-and-file growers relied upon the cooperative associations to provide their crews with housing. Powell's reforms were principally geared to ensuring the availability of the trained, skilled, resident work force required to handle the crop in a way that would minimize spoilage of a highly perishable product.

If citrus growers comprehended the industrial nature of their labor needs, they certainly grasped the urgent call for a body of scholarly experts dedicated to furthering the industry through advances in all aspects of citrus culture, including finding solutions to industry-threatening pest problems. Accordingly, they pushed this investment activity in many directions and at all levels, including persistent
Like musician Eddy Peabody, William Porter, a wealthy Colorado resident, also made Riverside his winter home. His Mediterranean Revival estate on Hawarden Drive, shown in this 1930s view, epitomized the suburban architectural style favored by early-twentieth-century California orange growers. Courtesy City of Riverside Museum.
efforts to foster high-quality education in elementary and secondary public schools, public and private colleges, and the University of California. At the university level, they fought for increased funds and better staffing for both the College of Agriculture and the general campuses. In particular, growers successfully agitated for establishment of an agricultural experiment station in Riverside to pursue the research needs of the citrus industry.69

Officially dedicated on February 14, 1907, the new Citrus Experiment Station expanded in 1917 through the lobbying efforts of Powell and the CFGE. By 1920, he and cohort H. J. Webber, the fellow Cornellian he had backed as director of the newly expanded station, had formed a virtual interlocking directorate between the University of California and the California Fruit Growers Exchange. The symbiosis benefited both organizations. On the one hand, Powell pushed appropriations and other bills for the College of Agriculture through the legislature by bringing the heavy weight of the entire industry to bear on state government, while Webber saw to it that the industry's many pest and other technical problems were solved in a timely fashion by the best scientific minds that the university could apply to the work. The Citrus Experiment Station became one of the most productive investments in scientific and educational infrastructure the region made during this time.70

CONCLUSION:

By World War I, California's citrus industry, which had arisen amid the nation's revolution of corporate capitalism, clearly represented an industrializing segment in American agriculture. In fact, Daniel insists that in California after 1900 "family farming survived only as a marginal appendage of a rural economy dominated in fact and in spirit by agribusinessmen as single-minded in their pursuit of profits as the most unwavering urban capitalist."71 By 1920, orange growers had endowed southern California with an industrial capitalist infrastructure, including vast numbers of workers from the periphery of capitalism, and had reshaped the region into a distinctive, though fabricated, image of civilized Mediterranean elegance. They had developed a fantastically successful export sector around the navel orange and other citrus varieties, built residential industries and financial institutions, and invested heavily in education and knowledge, all activities endemic to modern industrialized economies and prerequisites for accelerated economic development. The reconstructed Republican men and women, grandsons and granddaughters of the Second Great Awakening, who came to grow citrus in southern California at the end of the nineteenth century, represented a vanguard of the corporate liberal revolution. No other interpretation quite explains their rapid and successful takeover of the region and their leadership in its accelerated economic take-off.

See notes beginning on page 131.

H. Vincent Moses is curator of history, City of Riverside, and since 1983 has served as chief historian for the general plan and initial development of the California Citrus State Historic Park in Riverside. His expertise also lies in developing and implementing plans for collecting and interpreting southern California's inland cultural diversity. Dr. Moses is the author of several museum-sponsored publications, whose subjects include the Chinese in Riverside, as well as a forthcoming article on the citrus industry in the Business History Review. He recently completed his dissertation, "The Flying Wedge of Cooperation: G. Harold Powell, California Orange Growers, and the Corporate Reconstruction of American Agriculture, 1904-1922," at the University of California, Riverside.
California's Greatest Midwinter Event

By Frank Condon

You might say, in a manner of speaking, that California simply sits around all year long, waiting for its Orange Show to open up in San Bernardino, choose a pretty Orange Queen and prepare for the inevitable rain. It is true that Northern California appears to maintain a state of reasonable calm over the event, but Southern California is different, and Southern California orders tickets in vast numbers, drives into town in droves, and is ready to stand spellbound and look at oranges again.

The twenty-fourth display of citrus fruits has wound up with a flourish of trumpets, passed on into history, and the pleased orange growers of the valley are jingling their cash awards. The exhibitions have been held annually without a skip since 1910, and it is possible to trace the whole thing back to Mr. William Wolfkill, a pioneer.

Mr. Wolfkill jogged out of Los Angeles in the year 1841 in a horse and buggy, paused at the San Gabriel Mission and borrowed a couple of orange trees from the fathers. He planted them on his farm, and that was the beginning of the citrus industry in California. They grew, so he borrowed some more.

A Queen Job That Goes Begging

The orange and lemon growers now sell $100,000 worth every year, the Orange Show comes along annually like clockwork, and the pretty young ladies of the community step forward each spring to be photographed, hoping and praying they will be appointed Queen of the Oranges. It is considered quite an honor. Every year they must have a new Queen of the Oranges, chosen by a stern selecting committee, directed by Mr. E. M. Gore, who has been choosing personable young damsels for sixteen years with steady success. They never have any trouble picking the Orange Queen, but have no luck whatever selecting a Queen of the Lemons. Believing lemons should have a queen, they tried resolutely and failed, and so the show struggles along without any Lemon Queen.

Young ladies of San Bernardino and near-by towns have announced coldly that they will not compete, and that it would sound embarrassing to be walking along Fourth Street in a new dress and have people point you out as Queen of the Lemons. The job is still vacant, and never once has the show produced a Lemon Queen, although it sounded like a good idea at the start.

The show usually begins in February, lasts for ten days, and about 250,000 citizens purchase admission tickets and stand on one foot, then on the other, gazing at the overwhelming array of oranges. It is astonishing when you think of it—such multitude—for the oranges do not do anything. They merely lie in racks, made up to look like peacocks, elephants, sea shells, igloos, storks, mosques, orioles, lighthouses, golf players, bluebirds, and all sorts of queer objects that an orange would never think of being, if left to its own inclinations.

Each orange is presumed to be a prize winner, and is swathed in a skin-tight wrapper, and, of course, that makes plenty of wrapping jobs each year; for when one stands in the center of the auditorium and gazes about, there stands the overwhelming array of oranges. It is plausable, so they had one, and Mr. Perkins managed it for them, and that was in 1910.

The first year they called it, modestly enough, The Orange Show, and it went over with a bang. Three thousand ticket buyers strolled through the tent, voicing their admiration, eating peanuts and drinking orange juice, and the promoters were cheerful. It rained hard that year and the soppy tent fell down, but nobody was discouraged. The next year they put up a larger and stronger tent, called it The National Orange Show, and that's what it has been ever since.

When it's Orange Time in San Bernardino

After two or three years, with community interest mounting and attendance figures leaping, the business leaders of San Bernardino perceived that they had something important. It was not a matter of money with them, for the show is and always has been a nonprofit enterprise, a display window for the orange growers, wherein they may offer their finest fruits and win generous cash prizes. There are 10,000 of these growers in California, and as show time comes along, their excitement steadily increases.

More than 500,000 acres in California are given over to the raising of citrus fruits, and the output is genially referred to as the $100,000,000 annual crop. Oranges can be grown as far north as Oroville and Sacramento, and Northern California produces 2 per cent of the state's harvest. The San Joaquin Valley comes through with 14 per cent, and Southern California overshadows the rest of the state with 84 per cent. Counting carefully, you will discover 16,000,000 orange trees, all bearing fruit, evenly divided between navel and Valencia, and the crop goes out in 25,000,000 boxes to the breakfast tables of a nation. It calls for 75,000 freight cars at a time when hardly anybody wants 75,000 freight cars.

The champion exhibitor is Mr. T. E. Anderson, of Lindsay, California, who has been proudly showing his oranges for fifteen (Continued on Page 102)
Shinola cleans white shoes faster!

CALIFORNIA'S GREATEST MIDWINTER EVENT

(Continued from Page 15)

The citrus display is customarily divided into two main groups, the commercial and the noncommercial, the latter consisting of odd-looking things—umbos. They have 400 varieties of these eccentric fruits at the citrus Ex. (Continued from Page 15)
**SPRATT'S Meat-Fibre Biscuit Dog Foods**

Here's a grand dog book... and it's FREE!

**SPRATT'S MIXED BIRD SEED**

SEND FOR FREE FOLDER ON FEEDING CANARIES

**FAMOUS LAST LINES**

BOSS, can I have a raise? I assure you, sir, those shoes are guaranteed not to pinch.

FRESH? Why, madam, those eggs were laid yesterday.

Got a match? I want to light a cigarette.

Hello, honey, I'll be kept busy.

Whose 'ittle itsy witsy is it?"